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A B S T R A C T
Is the law at all an aid towards the defusing of the complex and poten­
tially explosive political situation in which the Republic finds itself today? 
Seeing that the state is a creation of the law, the answer to this question 
has to be affirmative, because the contentious institutions and structures 
of the state can only be applied through legal process.
Although race and ethnicity are concepts which lie outside the creative 
power of the law, and although constitutional apartheid has often ignored 
this fact, the most effective change of the system will take place through 
the use of the system itself. Encouraging signs that this is indeed 
happening are already discernible.
1. THE NATU RE AND ROLE OF LAW IN SO C IETY
The question as to the nature and role of the law in society is a funda­
mental jurisprudential if not a general philosophical matter. Philosophy 
is a tedious business, but difficult to avoid when fundamental questions 
are to be considered. The following statements are intended to summarize 
the matter:2
• The most fundamental function of the law is to order society
1 This paper was delivered at a conference of the Professors World 
Peace Academy held during March 20-23, 1986 in Johannesburg.
2 For a more detailed disquisition of these matters, cf. Venter, F. 
1985. Die Publiekregtelike Verhouding. Durban: Butterworths.
-487-
Koers 51(4) 1986 
ISSN 002'3-270X
• Law is relevant only within the context of a society
• Legal rules are devised by man for man
• Legal rules are imperative in nature and their prescription and 
maintenance require authority
• Those empowered to formulate legal rules authoritatively, are in a 
position to manipulate the law
• The moral quality of legal rules depends upon the lawgiver
Without law an orderly society would not be possible. It is not surp rising  
that the notion of law and order sounds like a duplication. In some 
contexts, such as the environment of South African security legislation, 
the expression "law and order" has obtained an unpalatable flavour. 
The connotation of forceful armed or clandestine combating of civil 
insurrection is however not what is meant here by order.
No society can know prosperity, development or calm without order. 
Obviously order does not only concern the relationship between the in ­
dividual and the state, because individual relationships, eg. marital, 
contractual, property, delictual and many other relationships are de­
pendent upon order in society. The responsibility for creating and 
maintaining societal order primarily falls upon the state, the legal system 
as a whole being its instrument.
The law concerns human relationships. Therefore law is only relevant 
in human society. Robinson Crusoe had no need for law as long as he 
was isolated from the rest of humanity. Although law is not the only 
ordering factor in society, it is the most fundamental. Some human re­
lationships, eg. those within the family or those pertaining to religion, 
are not as heavily dependent upon the law as others are. The relation­
ships between citizens within the state, and between them and those 
having governmental power in that state, however, is almost completely 
determined by law.
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Legal rules in its ordering of a multitude of facets of society do not have 
some external source. By this is not meant that moral, historical, eco­
nomic and other norms are irrelevant in law, but that the material, pos­
itive rules known as law are creations of man. By what means, with what 
motives and along which avenues those rules become law, is not, for the 
present discussion as important as the fact that they cannot become such 
without active human involvement. Law is made by people for people.
An important difference between legal and some other rules, eg. economic 
or social rules, is the fact that those subject to the law are obliged to 
obey it. Therefore the formulation of legal rules is, with some ex­
ceptions, in the imperative. The exceptions concern regulative measures, 
eg. those determining the nature of legal concepts such as contracts, 
accountability, status, etc. However, although the formulation of such 
rules is not in the imperative, their effect is that those concerned with 
them, are unquestionably bound to comply with them in order to obtain 
the benefits of their ordering effects.
Law is normally complied with by those subject to it, without external 
exhortation or compulsion. This is however not merely a matter of 
goodwill. Backing the imperative nature of legal rules, must be author­
ity. Authorities need to be in the position, in cases of non compliance 
with the law, to enforce compliance. The authority required for the 
authoritative formulation, maintenance and enforcement of law, vests in 
the state.
Since law is dependent for its formulation and application on some 
lawgiving organ of state, and such organ or organs are of necessity 
endowed with authority, the potential for the manipulation by the organs 
of state of the law for whatever purposes, is real. Through the ages, 
the problem of limitation and control over government, has occupied many 
concerned minds. One may even consider it to be one of the central 
themes of political and constitutional theory. Different constitutions 
provide for different means of control over government, some making it 
difficult and others enhancing the oppurtunities for organs of state to 
make unfettered use of the law for their own, eg. ideological purposes.
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Morality and law often occupy the same stage. In many instances the 
upholding of some of the moral standards of a society is made the task 
of the law. Obviously it would be fallacious to expect of the law to be 
the sole guarantor of morality. In fact, morality is a precept for law 
and, accordingly, positive law is formulated according to a particular 
moral perception. The nature and extent of constitutional control over 
government, being a function of the law, is fundamentally determined 
inter alia by the perception of morality currently espoused by, or en­
forced upon the legal community of a state.
In considering these matters, I believe one should strive to distinguish 
between moral ideals on the one hand, and attainable constitutional mo­
rality within the framework of a particular legal society on the other. 
In plain language, this means that the starting point for the "improve­
ment" of the standard of constitutional morality in a state as measured 
against some preconceived ideal, should not be that ideal, but a clear 
perception of the current notions of constitutional morality effective in 
the community. To me, such an approach seems not only to be theore­
tically sound, but also methodologically correct.
Although it has as yet not become the general approach in the Anglo- 
American systems of law, the Continental and many other systems, in ­
cluding the South African system, distinguish between private and public 
legal relationships. This distinction is not difficult to grasp. Public law 
concerns the relationship between a person or group of persons on the 
one hand and the state, endowed with authority, on the other hand. 
In the private legal relationship the state as bearer of authority is not 
a direct party as in public law. Whereas private legal relationships can 
certainly affect the attainment of a peaceful society, it is primarily in the 
field of public law, that one would seek a legal vehicle for the kind of 
change being contemplated here.
2. THE LEG AL RELAT IO N SH IP  BETWEEN THE ST A T E  AND IT S  C IT IZ EN S
The nature of the state has occupied many minds over many centuries. 
This notwithstanding, a single, indisputable definition of the state does
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not exist and some,’ consider it unnecessary to be consistent in such 
matters. Since language in general is the only proper, though insuffi­
cient medium of communication over such matters, definition or 
circumscription of basic terms cannot be avoided, even though differences 
in opinion over them will perpetually crop up.
The most practical, and to my mind theoretically acceptable, legal notion 
of the state is that its foundation and substance is human. The state 
consists of its citizens. People are citizens in terms of law. Citizenship 
law associates people, having certain things such as a country and a legal 
system in common, with a legal entity called a "state". This state exists 
for the purpose of ordering the citizenry by means of the authoritative 
formulation and maintenance of law. Authorities within the state, all 
organs of that body, consist of individuals or groups of people. If one 
accepts this, it becomes clear that an important measure of identity exists 
between the interests of the state and those of its citizens.
A peculiarity in contemporary Western constitutional thinking is its un­
compromising insistence upon the protection of the individual citizen 
against the authority of the state. Unfortunately the identity of interests 
between the citizen and his state mentioned above has more than often 
in history been distorted for various ideological reasons. Eventually 
approaches to the matter of state/individual relationships have polarised: 
on one side of the spectrum the individual, his interests and attributes 
are deified, and at the other extreme the state is considered to be 
all-powerful and an end unto itself.
The attributes of a particular state, being a creation of law, for legal 
ordering, is profoundly dependent upon the legal philosophy obtaining 
in its legal system. This naturally also applies to the relative legal po­
1 Eg. Baxter, L.G. 1982. The State' and other basic terms in public 
law. South African Law Journal, 212, who, at 236 states: "A s is evi­
dent, I am one of those who repudiates the personification of the 
State' as being no more than metaphysical and unnecessary 
inumbo-jumbo for lawyers".
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sitions of organs of state and individual citizens. A concept of pivotal 
importance in this regard, is the notion of authority.
The nature and source of governmental authority is another popular theme 
for philosophical divergence. It would serve little purpose to attempt 
here to review the various approaches to this question. Suffice it to say 
that whatever or whoever the different schools of thought consider to 
be the primeval source of authority, be it the common will of the people, 
the ability of the depository of authority to enforce its will or fate, 
common to all approaches is the fact that some questions always remain 
unanswered. Thus the will of the people is often construed as being 
founded upon some primordial, non-historical occurrence, the reasons for 
some to become powerful and others not, are fundamentally unanswerable 
and "fate" continues to be unknown, unidentified and uncontrollable.
I believe that authority in its most profound form is vested with God in 
such a manner that we cannot fully conceive of its real nature. The 
motivation for and method of distribution and dispensation by Him of such 
authority among people is therefore also not cognizable by us. We do 
however have to be able to manage and manipulate various forms of power 
and authority on different levels and in a variety of societal contexts. 
To enable us to understand and handle authority in the context of the 
state, we employ the law. It is in terms of the law that juridical authority 
is ordered in society. By means of public law, and especially constitu­
tional law, authority in the state is defined, distributed, delimited and 
destroyed. If change is therefore to be brought about in the manner in 
which authority is handled in South Africa, it is to constitutional law that 
we will have to look.
Since people form the fibre of the state, and citizens are the construction 
material of the state, it follows that the organs of state can only be 
human. The authority of a state is therefore without exception in the 
hands of individuals or groups of individuals who are, in their 
non-official capacities also mere citizens. This is however no guarantee 
that the power-bearers will not abuse their official powers. What does 
however become clear from such perspective, is that it is not the state 
or government as institution that constitutes a threat to the integrity of 
the individual, but that people entrusted with authority may, through
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their aberrant employment of power, present such threat. It may even 
be that such people misuse their positions in order to adapt constitutional 
institutions to their own ends or according to misguided ideologies. Even 
then, the antagonist is not the state as institution, but those in control 
of governmental authority. To make such a distinction may seem frivo­
lous, but consider the implications:
• it is not state institutions that should be aimed at by reformists, but 
the attitudes of the (human) organs of the state
• although state institutions are sometimes the end-products of injus­
tice, they are also the only available instruments for justice: d if­
ferently stated, constitutional justice can only be attained by means 
of state institutions
• precisely as the law may be used as a vehicle for confrontation, in 
matters of state and government it is eventually the only available 
means for adapting the status quo.
3. LAW, RACE, ET H N IC IT Y  AND APARTH EID
Although law concerns a very wide spectrum of aspects of human life, 
it is subject to some very important limitations. As was stated before, 
the aim of the law is to order society. In order to reach this aim, the 
law regulates many human actions and circumstances. Some things are 
outside the range of legal regulation, such as the laws of nature, eco­
nomic contingencies, human thinking (including eg. religion and political 
disposition), simply because these matters concern areas of reality where 
the law does not operate. The law may however provide for matters 
concerning things outside its range, especially concerning the conse­
quences of such things, eg. that damage to an ensured property caused 
by lightning creates liability for the ensurer to pay out the insured sum, 
or that conduct furthering the aims of communism is a crime.
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This then enables us to approach our subject-matter more directly. I 
would like to quote from LM du Plessis’ individual report to the H SR C 's  
Investigation into Intergroup Relations:*
" . . .  the ethnic g ro u p  ... with its extremely permeable lines of 
demarcation and its lack of a formal (or o ffic ia l') inner organization  
of authority, is an essentia lly  non-jurid ical collectivity. An ethnic  
grou p  would hold not on account of the law -based exercise of au ­
thority, but rather on account of the vo luntary assumption of re­
sponsib ility  of its members among themselves. Its  'prim ary basic  
o rd e r’ is of an ethical or moral and not a jurid ical nature: it is 
an associative collectivity in the true sense of the term. For these 
very  reasons it is impossible to g ive  a jurid ically  apt definition of 
the ethnic group: it is no juridical phenomenon. It also follows 
that the ethnic group or the volk cannot act as an entity in law 
(eg. a legal persona). The sense of unity among its members has 
a much more emotional than rational b a s is ."
Let us now consider some historical aspects of South African constitutional 
law. The fact that race and what may be termed "statutory ethnicity” 
are central pillars in South African constitutional law, has a well known 
historical background. From the earliest colonial times, distinctions be­
tween white or "european" and non-white were made in law and society.
Such distinctions mostly coincided with differences either in culture o r 
in station, or both. The B ritish  colonialists, who orig inally  
institutionalized discrim ination, rather dialectically proposed to apply the 
standard of "c iv ilisa tion " before eliminating differentiation, obviously  with 
little effect, since "c iv ilisa tion " was to them synonomous to 
"Anglic ization ", a process not h ighly successful in Africa. The 
Afrikaners, when they came to power in the racially sensitive post-war 
years following the catastrophic results of H itler 's ideological racism, 
attempted to change the emphasis upon race to an emphasis upon 
ethnicity, and called it "apartheid " and later "separate development",
Du Plessis, L.M. 1984. The Law as Regulator and/or Manager of 
Conflict Particularly in Ethnically Plural Societies, Potchefstroom 75.
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in order to attain the goals of this policy, extensive use was made of the 
public law, especially administrative and constitutional law. We find, 
therefore, that South African constitutional law has over many years 
developed a system typified by its dependence upon a distinction between 
racial groups within the body of its citizenry and a partial identification 
of ethnic groups as perceived by the legislature. Whether it was possible 
to do otherwise, given the historical racial and political attitudes, the 
cultural composition of the populace and the changing international status 
over the past centuries of the country and its parts, is only relevant 
for the purpose of an explanation or justification of the status quo. That 
is however not the present purpose.
4. SOME C O N ST ITU T IO N A L PERSPECT IVES
The most important, though by no means the only constitutional document 
in South Africa, is the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 110 
of 1983. One of the "national goals" identified by Parliament in the 
preamble to this Act, is "To respect, to further and to protect the 
self-determination of population groups and peoples."
In sections 14 and 15 a distinction is made between "general affairs" on 
the one hand, and on the other, "Matters which specially or differentially 
affect a population group in relation to the maintenance of its identity 
and the upholding and furtherance of its way of life, culture, traditions 
and customs being the "own affairs" of such population group.
The Constitution Act furthermore provides for the appointment of a 
Cabinet for the administration of general affairs, and three Ministers' 
Councils, each appointed from the relevant population group as repres­
ented in the three different Houses of Parliament instituted in terms of 
the Act.
Section 100 of the Act contains a number of definitions, including the 
following:
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• "population group" means the White persons, the Coloured persons 
or the Indians . . .
• "White person" and "Indian person" respectively simply means a 
person classified as such in terms of the Population Registration Act, 
1950, and
• "Coloured person” means a person classified as a member of the Cape 
Coloured, Malay or Griqua group or the group Other Coloureds in 
terms of the Population Registration Act, 1950.
These provisions more or less accomodate the non-Black South African
citizenry constitutionally. Regarding the Blacks, the following statutory
provisions apply:
• Section 2 of the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act, 46 of 1959 
states that "the Black population shall for the purpose of this Act 
consist of the following national units, namely -",  followed by a list 
that originally consisted of eight groups, was expanded once to in­
clude the South-Ndebele and reduced thrice following the independ­
ence of the TBVC  countries. At present the list comprises the 
North-Sotho, South-Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, South-Ndebele and Zulu 
un its.
• A system of tribal, regional and territorial authorities was instituted 
in terms of the Black Authorities Act, 68 of 1951 within the framework 
of the staturorily identified Black ethnic groups.
• Eventually, the National States Citizenship Act, 26 of 1970 created 
an additional, separate citizenship for each of the territorial authority 
areas without thereby terminating the South African citizenship of 
those affected.
• The Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, 21 of 1971 enabled the 
transformation of territorial authority areas into self-governing areas,
i.e. autonomous constitutional units each established for the ethnic 
unit concerned. In 1978 the expression "National States" replaced 
"Bantu Homelands".
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Thus the whole of the South African population is addressed constitu­
tionally in terms of race and ethnicity. Whereas the relevant legislation 
require ethnic distinctions to be made within the Black group for con­
stitutional purposes, the rest of the population is arranged constitu­
tionally only according to race. Since this is the case, it follows that 
the law concerning racial and ethnic classification, albeit intended to be 
an administrative matter, has fundamental constitutional implications, 
because such classification determines the form and extent of one's po­
tential participation in governmental affairs.
The legislation relevant to racial and ethnic classification is the Population 
Registration Act, 30 of 1950 to which the Constitution Act also refers. 
Section 5(1) of this Act provides as follows:
"Every  person ... shall be classified ... as a white person, a 
coloured person or a Black, as the case may be, and every coloured 
person and every Black whose name is so included shall be classi­
fied . . . according to the ethnic or other group to which he be­
longs ."
From what has been said previously, it is clear that the ethnic classi­
fication of Coloureds does not affect them constitutionally in the same 
manner as it does Blacks, since the various "Coloured" ethnic groups 
are constitutionally regarded to be one.
In view of what has been said about the limitations of the law, as well 
as the nature of ethnicity, one may now legitamately question the legality 
of the racial and ethnic approach of South African constitutional law. 
Keeping in mind that the South African Parliament is, and has been the 
sovereign lawgiver in South Africa since its coming into existence and 
that consequently there is no compulsory external or objective standard 
with which its legislation must comply, there can be little doubt about 
Parliament's competence to arrange the constitutional system as it did. 
Parliament may quite validly take cognizance of the actual racial and 
ethnic composition of the citizenry and legislate in terms thereof. It may 
even statutorily "create” fictitious racial and ethnic groupings and found 
other laws upon such groupings. What it can however not do, is to 
factually create racial and ethnic groups, for the simple reason that race
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and ethnicity, as has been pointed out, materially falls without the reach 
of the law.
Interpreting the constitutional system as described, it would seem that 
South African legislation quite legitimately (moral questions apart) d is ­
tinguishes between the white, black and Indian races, but that its at­
tempts at ethnic classification, though they coincide with some important 
ethnic factors, must be considered to be legal fictions: the Coloureds 
can hardly be considered to be an ethnic group in the sense of people 
voluntarily associating themselves with all other people classified as such, 
nor can they realistically be considered to belong to an identifiable sep­
arate race; the "ethnic" units statutorily recognized among the Black 
population may probably be considered to exist on the grounds of common 
culture within those groups, but in sofar as it is employed as an ex­
haustive classification, it is unrealistic, because a variety of ethnic as­
sociations, often divorced from tradition and mother tongue, have 
emerged in eg. the urban environment.
Mostly when these matters are considered, it is done in terms of the 
morality of the system. In principle there is nothing wrong with such 
an approach. Moral indignation however tends to obscure rather than 
enlighten. I would therefore propose that we regard the system as a 
given fact, and with the clear general ideal of constructing a constitu­
tional system just to all concerned, consider the legal adjustments re­
quired and options available to us in order to enhance peaceful change.
Race and ethnicity can obviously not be instantaneously eradicated from 
the statute books without much constitutional, administrative and personal 
confusion. In fact, as long as these phenomena remain to be important 
sociological factors in our society, the law will not be able to ignore them. 
What is however required, is that the existing legislative attempts at 
creating racial and ethnic groups, should be adapted to legislative ac­
knowledgement of the extra-juridical existence of racial d iversity and 
ethnicity founded upon voluntary association, without necessarily em­
ploying those factors as the main cornerstones of the constitution.
In order to facilitate the transition from the present system to one more 
satisfactory to all concerned, use will inevitably have to be made of the
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structures of the present system. Whatever the merits or demerits of 
the tricameral parliament may be, until such time as that body replaces 
itself in terms of its own legislation, nothing short of a bloody civil war 
will bring a new system about. Therefore one must expect the initiatives 
to come from the established authorities. In this regard some very 
positive indications of an awareness of the necessity for such initiatives 
have become evident, including the acceptance of
• the principle of power sharing in a future unitary state
• common citizenship
• equal political, educational and economic oppurtunities for all and
• the necessity for negotiation.
Judging from governmental announcements made in the recent past, one 
may soon expect legislation concerning the restoration of citizenship to 
those who have involuntarily lost it to T BV C  citizenship, as well as the 
creation of a body designed to serve as an authoritative institution for 
negotiating and designing a restructured constitutional dispensation sat­
isfactory also to the Black citizenry.
Given the need to delegislate race and ethnicity on the one hand, to build 
on the other hand upon the foundations of the status quo making use of 
the promised new structures, what options may realistically be consid­
ered?
1 . The proposed statutory council may prove to be of pivotal importance 
to future constitutional development, provided that
• those taking part in its deliberations can authentically lay claim 
to being representative. This may require a special general 
election, especially among the Black population, since it cannot 
confidently be presumed that the elected leaders of the national 
states also enjoy the support of a substantial part of the urban 
population;
-499-
• the statutory council is entrusted with substantia l influence. 
T h is  does not mean that it will have to replace Parliament, since 
Parliament will have to be the eventual amender of the constitu ­
tion. It does however mean that such body should not merely 
be an adv iso ry  or consultative institution, but that it should have 
the authority to make decisions or negotiate agreements that will 
b ind the State President to introduce legislation to implement such 
decisions or agreements.
2. From equitable negotiation and deliberation one would not expect a 
conventional un itary constitution to emerge, at least not initially. 
The independent T B V C -sta te s  as well as the Black national states 
do represent vested political and constitutional interests and rights. 
Sim ilarly the various social institutions designed for racial, ethnic 
and cultural differentiation, in the fields of eg. education and 
housing, cannot be replaced overn ight. Delegislation of race and 
ethnicity is therefore no simple matter, especially where legislated 
differentiation coincide with perceived social differences. A primary 
theme for negotiation will therefore have to be the minima and maxima 
of racial and ethnic delegislation.
3. Finally, it would seem that, whatever the details of an eventual new 
system may prove to be, it will have to operate upon the presumption 
that a formidable range of interests will have to be weighed and 
counterweighed. To achieve that, human goodwill, at best a very 
fragile commodity, will have to be bolstered by constitutional stru c ­
tures and procedures tailor-made for and generally agreed upon by 
a substantial majority of South Africans. Apart from the intensive 
deliberation that is therefore needed, the eventual vehicle for actual 
peaceful change, will have to be the order of law.
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